taking the medication and her condition will rapidly deteriorate." 10 This view was supported by D.R's Approved Social Worker, whose report stated:
"Everybody involved with [D.R.] recognises that compliance with medication is the issue. [D.R.] has no insight into her illness and I feel masks her symptoms because she is aware we feel they indicate illness. She has promised to accept the depot injection for two years. I am not convinced she will be able to keep this promise. It may be wise to keep [D.R.] on section 3 a little longer, as this will ensure that she is treated and perhaps the revolving door cycle can be broken." 11 A report written for the managers' meeting by a nurse suggested that D.R. did not believe she was ill and that she took her medication with reluctance. As to the consequences if she were discharged, it stated: "Compliance with treatment is an area of concern with [D.R.]. It is felt she would become non-compliant if discharged. [D.R.] would not remain as an informal patient on the ward if taken off current section. [D.R's] mental health state would deteriorate and she would be a risk to herself/others." 12 Having received these reports, and having heard from various witnesses, including D.R. herself, the managers decided not to discharge her. In the written grounds for their decision they stated:
"We are convinced the patient is suffering from a mental disorder which requires treatment. If she were not detained, we doubt her compliance. Given the recent past history and the social worker's evidence about 'revolving door', we think a longer period of detention is necessary." 13 Her application to the Administrative Court having been initiated on 6 March 2002, D.R. was in fact discharged from detention on 11 April 2002. (The Judge said he had been assured that the second event was not linked to the first.) However, she soon stopped taking her medication, and on 9 June 2002 she was re-admitted to hospital, this time for assessment under MHA 1983, section 2.
Law
When furnishing his renewal report, D.R's RMO had to address the statutory conditions set out in MHA 1983, section 20(4). They require that: "(a) the patient is suffering from mental illness, severe mental impairment, psychopathic disorder or mental impairment, and his mental disorder is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to receive medical treatment in a hospital; and "(b) such treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his condition; and "(c) it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of other persons that he should receive such treatment and that it cannot be provided unless he continues to be detained."
Of course, section 20(4) concludes:
"[I]n the case of mental illness or severe mental impairment, it shall be an alternative to the condition specified in paragraph (b) above that the patient, if discharged, is unlikely to be able to care for himself, to obtain the care which he needs or to guard himself against serious exploitation."
14
Wilson J. noted that there was judicial authority to the effect that the word 'detained' in MHA 1983, section 20(4)(c) should in fact be read as "liable to be detained", 15 and he concluded:
"[A]ccordingly, the conditions for renewal can be satisfied even in relation to a patient who is no longer actually detained but has been granted leave of absence under s. 17 of the Act."
16
The RMO may only furnish his report "if it appears to him" that these conditions are satisfied.
17
Argument -the Claimant
On behalf of D.R, it was argued that the MHA 1983, section 20(4) conditions had not been fulfilled and therefore, that the RMO had acted unlawfully in renewing D.R's liability to detention and the hospital managers had acted unlawfully in sanctioning that renewal. 21 Her counsel noted that MHA 1983, section 23(2) gave hospital managers the discretion to discharge a patient, and to do so even if the renewal conditions were met. 22 He suggested that before deciding not to exercise this discretion, the managers should have considered whether, as an alternative, D.R. might be made subject to After-care under Supervision. 23 The managers had, of course, ignored that possibility, and D.R's counsel argued that they had therefore acted irrationally and in breach of the 'right to liberty' set out in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR').
Argument -the Defendant
The Defendant's Counsel, Miss Kristina Stern, conceded that the renewal criteria would only be satisfied if the plans for a patient included a significant element of treatment in hospital. However, she contended that the terms 'in-patient' and 'out-patient' represented a gloss upon the renewal criteria that was unhelpful and not supported by MHA 1983. She too relied upon the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Barker, and she argued that the element of treatment in hospital contained in the plans for D.R. was significant enough to make those plans lawful. The judge set out that reasoning that had led him to this relatively simple formulation. He said:
"In my view this case is centrally an enquiry into the words 'medical treatment in a hospital' set out in [MHA 1983 , section 20(4)] (a) and repeated, by reference, in (b) and (c). The claimant clearly suffers from mental illness so the enquiry at (a) was whether it was of a nature or degree which made it appropriate for her to receive 'medical treatment in a hospital'. The enquiry at (b) […] was whether 'such' treatment was likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of her condition. The enquiry at (c) was whether 'such' treatment could not be provided unless she continued to be liable to be detained and unless it was necessary for the health or safety of herself or (for example) her daughter."
27

Decision
The managers' test for renewal
Wilson J. did not deal with the substantive issue straight away. First, he felt it necessary to determine a preliminary point: whether, when considering the discharge of a patient such as D.R, the hospital managers must have regard to the 'admission' criteria contained in MHA 1983, section 3(2) or the 'renewal' criteria in section 20(4).
Noting that the MHA 1983 Code of Practice states, "the essential yardstick in considering a review application is whether the grounds for admission or continued detention under the Act are satisfied," 28 the judge concluded:
here managers are considering whether to order discharge on expiry of the initial period of liability to detention notwithstanding the doctor's renewal, it is the conditions for renewal set by [MHA 1983 ,] section 20(4) which logically they should address."
29
The ECHR and the managers' discretion to discharge
The ECHR argument put forward on behalf of D.R. was given equally short shrift. It was "a central feature", the judge said, of the provisions for after-care under supervision that a patient could not be compelled to receive the medication that had been prescribed for her. However, in this case: 
Renewal during a period of leave
As far as the substantive issue in the case was concerned, Wilson J. began by distinguishing the facts of this case from those of Hallstrom and Gardner. He noted that:
"In neither of them did the plan which formed the basis of (in the former) the compulsory admission for treatment and (in the latter) the renewal of the authority for detention include any element of treatment in hospital."
31
In both cases, the Judge continued, the defendant doctors had the same plan, which was "for the claimants to remain entirely in the community (apart, in the former, from the very first night, such being a cosmetic provision with no therapeutic purpose)"; 32 and in each case:
he motive behind the invocation of compulsory powers […] was to be able to require (or to threaten to require) the claimants to take medication in the community, without which they were considered unlikely to do so." 
34
As we have seen, Wilson J. believed that the plans made in Hallstrom and Gardner did not include any element of treatment in hospital. The difficulty, he said, was that McCullough J. had gone on "to reach beyond the easy conclusion that the plan for the claimants was not in any way for treatment in a hospital". "The phrase 'his mental disorder … makes it appropriate for him to receive medical treatment in a hospital' in [MHA 1983 ] section 3(2)(a) also leads to the conclusion that the section is concerned with those whose mental condition requires in-patient treatment. Treatment in a hospital does not mean treatment at a hospital, as [leading counsel for the defendants], in effect, contends. If his construction were correct there would be a distinction between the patient who could appropriately be treated at home and the patient who could appropriately be treated at the out-patients' department of a hospital. Such a distinction would be without reason. When it is remembered that the section authorises compulsory detention in a hospital it is at once clear why a distinction should be made between those whom it is appropriate to treat in a hospital, i.e. as in-patients, and those to whom it is appropriate to treat otherwise, whether at the out-patient department of the hospital or at home or elsewhere."
37
Turning to Barker, Wilson J. noted that the treatment plan that the patient sought to overturn would have required her "to be in hospital only for two nights and the majority of two days each week".
38 During this time "she was to be assessed, monitored and tested (in particular for the use of illicit drugs) and to attend occupational and art therapy". 39 The Judge noted that although the word 'in-patient' is used in MHA 1983, section 5 it is nowhere defined. However, he stated that it "could properly be used to describe the Claimant in [Barker]" because it "suggests the allocation and use, albeit not at all times, of a hospital bed". 40 In fact, when upholding the renewal of the patient's detention, the then Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, had specifically described her as an "in-patient". However, Wilson J. now held, this was not because Lord Woolf approved of McCullough J's 'in-patient' / 'out-patient' distinction, but simply because "he held that the proposed treatment should be considered, not atomistically but as a whole". 41 As support for this proposition, the Judge cited 42 the following passage from the judgment in Barker:
"It is the treatment as a whole which must be calculated to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of the mental disorder from which the patient is suffering. As long as treatment viewed in that way involves treatment as an in-patient the requirements of the section can be met."
43
Still on the subject of Barker, Wilson J. noted 44 that, in concurring with the Master of the Rolls, Thorpe L.J. had not used the word 'in-patient'; rather, he had upheld the renewal of the patient's detention with the following words:
"[H]er home base remained the hospital despite the fact that she slept many more nights out than in and despite the fact that she had a daily leave of absence for 4 hours on each of the 2 days per week when she returned to the hospital. It seems obvious to me that those 2 days of detention each week were an essential ingredient of the treatment […] Her presence in the hospital each Tuesday and Wednesday was an essential part of the treatment package, it could only be provided in the hospital and could only be effectively provided if the appellant continued to be detained." 45 It was this aspect of Barker, the Judge noted, that both parties had cited in support of their conflicting arguments. His decision suggests that it supports the Defendant's case rather more fully. Describing it as "predictable", Wilson J. dismissed the submission made for D.R. He ruled that the distinction that McCullough J. had drawn in Hallstrom and Gardner between 'in-patient' and 'outpatient' care had been obiter and also unnecessary. Further, Wilson J. said that the distinction between treatment at a hospital and treatment in a hospital was "too subtle for me", and he added: "When I eat at a restaurant, I eat in a restaurant." The treatment proposed for the patient in Barker had "happened to be of an in-patient character," so it was natural that Lord Woolf should describe it as such. However: "[T]hat does not make it become the test, any more than the reference of Thorpe L.J. to a 'home base' renders that concept the test." 47 Applying the decision in Barker, Wilson J. held that it was significant because it established that the renewal of detention could be lawful even though only part of the plan was for treatment in hospital. It would suffice "if that part of the plan was, to borrow another phrase from the judgment of Thorpe LJ, an essential ingredient"; but "[I]t would be an impermissible -indeed an illogical -gloss upon the Act to make lawfulness depend upon a plan to put the patient at times into a hospital bed." 48 By way of explication, the Judge added:
"There is no magic in a bed; indeed the facility for treatment at night, when the patient is in bed, must be much less than for treatment during the day." " […] was to preserve the claimant's links with the community; to reduce the stress caused by hospital surroundings which she found particularly uncongenial; and to build a platform of trust between her and the clinicians upon which dialogue might be constructed and insight on her part into her illness engendered". 54 The Judge recalled that in Barker the Court of Appeal had stressed the importance not merely of granting leave, but also of considering its effect upon the patient. Here, he said: "[T]he requirement to attend hospital on Fridays between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm and on Monday mornings was also […] a significant component of the plan. The role of occupational therapy as part of the treatment of mental illness needs no explanation. But the attendance at hospital on Monday mornings seems to me to be likely to have been even more important. Such was to be the occasion for the attempted dialogue; for monitoring; for assessment and for review." He noted that the Government's plans to reform mental health law included provisions that would enable medical treatment for mental disorder to be imposed upon a "hospital non-resident". 57 However, he concluded: "Unless and until this reform is enacted, the law will remain (if my interpretation of it be sound) that the compulsory administration of medication to a patient can be secured only by making him liable to be detained or renewing such liability; that such may be achieved only if a significant component of the plan is for treatment in hospital; and that, in such an enquiry, the difference between in-patient and out-patient treatment is irrelevant." 58 The Claimant's application for judicial review was therefore dismissed.
Comment
Treatment in hospital must form a significant component of the care plan
The circumstances in which a patient's detention may be renewed are now somewhat clearer. In particular, we know that that step may be taken even while a patient is on leave, provided treatment in hospital forms a "significant component" of the plan for him/her. "[T]here will come a time when, even though it is certain that treatment will be required at some stage in the future, the timing of that treatment is so uncertain that it is no longer 'appropriate' for the patient to continue to be liable to detention." 62 There was no mention of Epsom and St. Helier in the judgment in D.R, and the two cases are easily distinguishable (chiefly because definite plans had been made for the patient in D.R. to return to hospital in the future). However, they both conceive of psychiatric treatment as something that may be provided elsewhere than in a hospital, and they recognise that patients may still need to be subject to the constraints of the 1983 Act when they have ceased to be confined.
Whether the rationale for the judgments in Barker, Epsom and St. Helier and D.R. represents a flight from Hallstrom and Gardner is, however, a different question. It is likely that these two groups of cases yielded different results simply because they were concerned with different circumstances. Lord Woolf alluded to this possibility in Barker, when he said: 74 This would seem to go further than the offer and acceptance of a bed envisaged by the Code of Practice, and it seems to require more from the putative patient than mere co-operation in the admission process. If so, and if Wilson J's definition is to be preferred, it may make it harder for patients to acquire in-patient status, and for doctors or nurses of the prescribed class to subject them to the holding powers contained in MHA 1983, section 5(2) or (4).
Is a bed necessary?
There is at least one facet of the judgment of Wilson J. in D.R. that might prove troublesome if it were to be misconstrued. The judge said:
"In my view it would be an impermissible -indeed an illogical -gloss upon the Act to make lawfulness depend upon a plan to put the patient at times into a hospital bed. There is no magic in a bed […] ."
75
It is necessary to treat this statement with caution. First, because it is not clear whether Wilson J. saw the existence of a bed as a test -albeit an impermissible test -of the lawfulness of a patient's original detention or merely of its renewal. Of course, the test to which he referred had been adopted by McCullough J. in Hallstrom and Gardner. However, the first of these cases concerned the criteria for initial admission, and the second, those for renewal. Wilson J. himself suggests that the 'in-patient' / 'out-patient' distinction -which generated that test and was, of course, the chief product of those cases -resulted from a 'gloss' upon the Mental Health Act. This was certainly how it was described by the Defendant's counsel in D.R., when she wished to criticise the approach of the Claimant's counsel to the criteria for renewal. It seems likely, therefore, that Wilson J. intended to forswear the 'bed test' merely in so far as it could be applied to the renewal of a patient's detention, and that he did not intend his words to apply more generally, to the criteria for initial admission.
That is perhaps fortunate, for, taken on their own, his words -and in particular, the perhaps plaintive statement that "there is no magic in a bed" -might be thought to suggest that a patient may lawfully be taken into detention without a bed having first been found for him/her. Although there are some mental health professionals who would find this a deeply attractive argument, it has no basis in the judgment in this case.
In the chapter dedicated to 'Assessment', under the heading 'Individual professional responsibility -the doctor', the current Code of Practice states that: "The doctor should: […] ensure that, where there is to be an application for admission, a hospital bed will be available." Although this statement does not go so far as to prohibit the making of an application for admission where no bed is available -or the giving of a medical recommendation in support of such an application -it should not lightly be dismissed.
However, as is discussed in the following section, the judgment of Wilson J. does point up a significant, related facet of mental health law.
The compulsory treatment of patients who have not been admitted to hospital
If medical treatment for mental disorder is to be imposed upon a 'detained' patient, s/he will first have to be 'admitted'. This is because the condition of being 'detained' is contingent upon there having been an 'admission'. Section 6(2) of MHA 1983 states:
"Where a patient is admitted […] to the hospital specified in [the] application […] the application shall be sufficient authority for the managers to detain the patient in the hospital in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 77 Clearly, and as a matter of pure logic, 'admission' must imply the offer and acceptance -even if, to recall Wilson J's formulation, it doesn't strictly require the use -of a hospital bed. Therefore, even if it is intended immediately to grant the patient leave -albeit with hospital assessment, monitoring and review as a significant component of his/her treatment plan -it will still be necessary to find him/her a bed to call his/her own. However, medical treatment for mental disorder may be provided to needful patients who are not detained, and even though they have not been 'admitted' to hospital.
The providing of medical treatment for a patient's mental disorder is governed by Part IV of MHA 1983, and in particular, by the provisions in, inter alia, sections 58 and 63. The patients to whom those provisions may be applied are listed in section 56. Before setting out a number of exceptions that are irrelevant for present purposes, that section states: "(1) This Part of this Act applies to any patient liable to be detained under this Act." 78 As the judgment in the present case makes clear, although all patients who are 'detained' under MHA 1983 may also be said to be 'liable to be detained', the reverse is by no means inevitably the case. In fact, this had been already hinted at in Hallstrom and Gardner, where McCullough J. stated: "Ignoring the position of a patient in respect of whom authority to detain has come into existence but who has not yet been brought under detention and of those patients absent without leave, those 'liable to be detained' are, therefore, those who are detained and those who have been granted leave of absence." 79 So, alongside patients who, having been detained, are now enjoying leave of absence, those in respect of whom an admission application has been "duly completed" are also "liable to be detained", even though that application has not yet been accepted by the managers of the hospital in which it is hoped to detain them.
Of course, the possibility of imposing medical treatment for mental disorder upon such patients will remain for only so long as the application for their admission to hospital under MHA 1983 
